XMSS: Extended Hash-Based Signatures

(draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-03)

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Hash-based Signature Schemes

[Mer89]

- Post quantum
- Only secure hash function
- Security well understood
- Fast



FIG 1
AN AUTHENTICATION TREE WITH N = 8.

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Merkle's Hash-based Signatures



XMSS

Tree: Uses bitmasks

Leafs: Use binary tree with bitmasks

OTS: WOTS^{+}

Message digest: Randomized hashing

Collision-resilient

-> signature size halved



Multi-Tree XMSS

Uses multiple layers of trees

-> Key generation
(= Building first tree on each layer)
$\Theta(2^h) \rightarrow \Theta(d*2^{h/d})$

-> Allows to reduce worst-case signing times
$\Theta(\mathrm{h}/2) \rightarrow \Theta(h/2d)$



XMSS-T (Hülsing, Rijneveld, Song – PKC'16)

- draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures actually implements XMSS-T not XMSS as published at PQCrypto'11
- Adds multi-target attack resistance
- Tight security reduction
  -> smaller sigs at same security

- Stateful, but building block for SPHINCS

Recent Changes

New Message Hash

Randomized hashing (dgst = H(R_i,M_i)) allows for Multi-Target-Attacks

- After q signatures, find (R, M) such that H(R,M) = H(R_i,M_i) for 0 <= i < q
- Security level for n bit hash function: n – log q

Fix: Add index for domain separation

- -03 uses dgst = H(R_i, i, M_i)
- Prevents Multi-Target-Attacks in practice but no formal proof (but proof trivial in random oracle model).

Addressing Scheme

-02:

- Fields were crossing byte and word boundaries
- Annoying for implementers

-03:

- Addresses redesigned to respect byte and word boundaries (where possible)

Upcoming changes

- Instantiation (used hash function)
- Addressing Scheme
- Generation of randomness for message hash
- Few more minor comments

Instantiation

- Currently:
  - SHA2-256 + ChaCha20 (mandatory)
  - SHA2-512 (mandatory)
- Discussion:
  - Adding SHA3 parameter sets? Optional or required?
  - Make SHA2-512 optional? (256 bit quantum security, 512 classical security)
  - Pure SHA2-256 as mandatory? (Code size / NIST support)

Instantiation

- Proposal:
  - SHA2-256 (mandatory)
    - Replace ChaCha20 by simplified HMAC construction (just prepend padded key, fine as dealing with fixed input size)
  - SHA2-512 (optional)
    - Same constructions as for SHA2-256
  - SHA3-256/512 (optional)
    - Proposal by van Assche / Daemon
    - Actually using SHAKE128 / SHAKE256

Addressing Scheme

- Introduces limits on parameter sets
- Critic: 40 bits for tree index not enough (indeed, not enough for SPHINCS)
- Address space currently exhausted
- Would need bigger addresses -> prevents use of ChaCha for key / bitmask generation -> speed penalty

Addressing Scheme

- Proposal:
  - Remove ChaCha20 instantiation
  - Increase address length to 32 bytes (currently 16 bytes)
  - Allows to assign sufficient space to all fields without crossing byte boundaries

Generation of R

- Currently „common approach“:

$$R = PRF(SK, M)$$

- As XMSS is stateful, we could do

$$R = PRF(SK, idx)$$

+ processing message just once

- different from other schemes

Thank you!
Questions / Feedback ?